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This paper describes vital systems security as a distinctive form through which 
planners and strategists understand and manage “security” problems. In what 
follows, we develop the concept of vital systems security through a contrast 
with two more familiar forms of collective security: sovereign state security and 
population security. The aim is to create an analytical vocabulary for a more 
acute critical vantage on contemporary problems of security.  
 
Vital systems security refers to the protection of systems that are critical to the 
maintaining economic and political order. These include key infrastructures 
(roads, electricity grids, communications, food and water supply), key 
institutions (markets and governmental entities), and key public services 
(hospitals). Vital systems security is concerned with threats that may be difficult 
or impossible to prevent, such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or 
pandemic disease. Its aim, thus, is to reduce the vulnerability of critical systems 
to these events, and to increase the capacity to respond to and recover from 
them. 
 
Vital systems security has become an increasingly central practice of 
government in the latter half of the 20th century and the first years of the 21st 
century. Elements of this form of security can be identified in diverse domains 
of policy-making and planning activity such as disaster management and 
emergency response. Most recently, they have been implemented under rubrics 
such as “critical infrastructure protection” and “homeland security,” particularly 
in the wake of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, and in discussions around a possible 
future avian flu pandemic. In these contexts, vital systems security is connected 
to fundamental questions concerning how we define threats to collective 
security, what appropriate forms of response are, and what the state’s 
responsibility is for ensuring the security of national populations. 
 
And yet, this form of security has been largely neglected by social scientists 
looking at security questions. In what follows, we will: (1) define vital systems 
security by contrasting it to other forms of collective security; (2) review key 
historical moments in the development of vital systems security in the United 
States after World War II; (3) specify the contemporary context in which this 
form of security can be seen as central to changing understandings of – and 
organizational responses to – security problems; (4) suggest conceptual and 
analytical orientations that might emerge from this framework. 
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Forms of Collective Security: An Overview 
 
Most policy-oriented and academic discussions have focused on two kinds of 
security: sovereign state security and population security. Both are forms of 
collective security in the sense that they involve protecting national populations 
against potential threats. Each arose at a distinctive historical conjuncture in 
response to problems and events.  
 
Sovereign state security is concerned with the territorial sovereignty of the state 
and the threat to sovereignty posed by external enemies. Its history can be 
dated to the formation of the modern state and the treaty of Westphalia (1648). 
It is associated with state monopolization of legitimate violence and with the 
beginning of the modern interstate system. Sovereign state security includes 
both practices associated with military conflict with other states and practices 
associated with “cold” conflicts, such as diplomacy, deterrence, and 
containment. In the period after World War II sovereign state security in the 
United States was structured by the strategies of the Cold War. Consequently, 
the end of the Cold War has raised a range of questions about how to define 
the significant problems of sovereign state security.   
 
Population security is concerned with the health and welfare of national 
populations. It addresses what have been called “pathologies of the social” – 
phenomena such as endemic disease and poverty that can be mapped onto 
the regularities of collective life.1 The techniques of population security – such 
as social insurance and urbanism – emerged in the late 18th to mid-19th centuries. 
They were a response both to the increasing popular unrest faced by classical 
monarchies and to the worsening conditions of collective life in growing 
industrial cities. In contrast to sovereign state security, which has been the 
provenance of the military since the establishment of permanent standing 
armies in the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe, population security has been 
primarily the responsibility of organizations dealing with civilian administration. 
The contemporary political logic of population security has been shaped by, 
first, the consolidation of the welfare state in the middle part of the 20th century, 
and, second, efforts to enact neoliberal welfare reform since the 1970s. 
 
Since World War II, a new form of collective security has been emerging. In 
part, it is the product of new kinds of threats, such as the threat of aerial 
bombing, nuclear war, or technologically-induced environmental catastrophe. In 
part, it has developed from an awareness of the vulnerability of the complex 
technological systems upon which modern life is dependent.2 These newly 
                                                
1 For a discussion of the rise of “pathologies of the social” see Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms 
and Forms of the Social Environment. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989. 
2 Ulrich Beck has focused attention on this specific kind of vulnerabilities that arise from threats to the 
systems that underpin modernity. Though he has recognized that these threats are not manageable 
 
 
Collier and Lakoff / Vital Systems Security 
 
 3 
perceived threats, in turn, have been approached through a new rationality of 
collective security, and a new political organization of response that we call vital 
systems security.  
 
Vital systems security refers to governmental efforts to protect key 
infrastructures (roads, electricity grids, communications, food and water 
supply), institutions (markets and governmental entities), and public services 
(hospitals), and to increase the capacity to respond to and recover from events 
that threaten them. The general principles, techniques, forms of knowledge, 
and political response associated with vital systems security can be contrasted 
to sovereign state security and population security (see Table 1). These forms 
of security differ in: (1) the definition of relevant kinds of threats (both the danger 
and what is endangered) that should be addressed in the framework of vital 
systems security; (2) the normative rationality that defines a response to these 
threats; and (3) the political logic that defines the role of the state in relationship 
to private sector, public sector, and non-profit sector actors in responding to 
these threats, and in providing a certain form of security.  
 
The kinds of threats seen as relevant to vital systems security include events 
such as hurricanes, terror attacks, epidemics, ecological catastrophes, and 
earthquakes. Such events – often referred to as “low probability, high 
consequence” – have a number of common features. First, they threaten key 
infrastructures, such as energy, transportation, and communications systems, 
economic institutions, and vital production systems, and they challenge the 
capacity of organizations involved in response and recovery, such as hospitals, 
coordinated logistics operations, and rescue capabilities. Second, the 
probability of such events is uncertain. Although they are foreseeable, they are 
not predictable in the strict insurantial sense that their likelihood and probable 
consequences could be subject to actuarial analysis. Third, from the 
perspective of vital systems security the source of the threat may be beyond 
the control of security planners – indeed, it may be unknown. Thus, rather than 
prevention, the focus of vital systems security is on the vulnerability of vital 
systems and the readiness of private and public response. 
 
The normative rationality relevant to vital systems security is “preparedness”. 
The norm of preparedness demands that experts constantly assess the 
vulnerability of vital systems and the readiness to respond to, and recover from, 
events that threaten them. The goal of this form of security is not necessarily to 
prevent events from happening but to mitigate their consequences – in other 
words, to keep a disaster from turning into a catastrophe. Techniques of 
preparedness seek to:  
                                                                                                                                     
within an insurantial model of risk management he has not identified new forms through which they 
are managed.  See, for example, World Risk Society (1997). 
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Table 1 
Political Logics of Collective Security 
  
 
• Imagine possible events and assess their impact through means 
such as scenario planning. 
• Test response and recovery mechanisms through exercises. 
• Assess and minimize vulnerabilities by securing critical 
infrastructures. 
 
Increase capacity to respond and recover by improving early detection, 
strengthening communication and coordination among responders. It is helpful 
to contrast preparedness and social insurance as normative rationalities that 
seek to provide different kinds of security to domestic populations (see Table 
2). Both make it possible to bring future threats into the present in order to 
manage them. While insurance seeks to calculate probability and distribute risk, 
preparedness assumes that probability is not calculable and so enacts 
plausible scenarios in order to reveal vulnerabilities. An “insurantial” approach 
seeks to calculate the probability of risks to discrete individuals and to 
distribute risk over a population. A framework of “preparedness,” by contrast, 
begins from the assumption that the probability of certain threats is not strictly  
 
 
 Nation-State Security Population Security Vital Systems Security 
Moment of 
articulation 
17th century territorial  
monarchies 
Late 19th century social  
welfare 
Mid-20th century civil 
defense 
Aim 
Secure territorial  
sovereignty 
Collectivize risks to the  
population 
Preparedness for  
emergencies 
Object 
Enemies of the state 
(internal and external) 
Pathologies of the 
social (poverty, urban 
unrest) 
Potential catastrophes; 
vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructure 
Form of  
Rationality 
Strategy  Insurance Preparedness 
Examples of  
Apparatuses 
Military, border control,  
intelligence 
Public health,  
education, urban 
hygiene, social security 
Disease surveillance;  
Environmental 
detection; data mining  
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Table 2 
Normative Rationalities – Insurance versus Preparedness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Insurance Preparedness 
Type of event 
addressed 
 
Calculable, relatively limited 
scope (one can predict how 
often it will occur, but not to 
whom) 
Not calculable, potentially 
catastrophic scope (one can 
say that it is likely to happen, 
but not when or where) 
Knowledge 
required about 
event 
Archival – actuarial tables of 
statistics 
Narrative, imagined 
How possible 
event is 
transformed 
From external danger to 
manageable risks 
From outside threat to 
vulnerability to be mitigated 
Technical 
operation 
Calculation of probability using 
tables of frequency 
Gauge current vulnerabilities 
through imaginative techniques 
(scenarios, simulations) 
How to alleviate 
threat 
Spread risks over population 
Build capabilities for response 
to multiple threats 
Temporal 
orientation 
Continuing, modulated attention 
Ongoing vigilant alertness; 
sporadic intervention, lasting 
only for duration of event and 
recovery 
Initial site of 
application 
17th century shipping and 
navigation 
Cold War threat of atomic 
attack 
Extension to new 
sites 
Property (insurance against fire, 
flood), life, accident, old age 
Natural disaster, ecological 
catastrophe, humanitarian 
emergency, terrorism 
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calculable, and would, therefore, try to enact plausible scenarios in order to 
reveal vulnerabilities and direct readiness efforts.3 
 
Finally, the political logic of vital systems security enjoins the state to take 
responsibility for ensuring the ongoing functioning of critical systems in the face 
of disastrous events. This political logic is associated with a distinctive 
temporality of intervention: while vital systems security requires only sporadic 
intervention by central authorities – only in the case of an event – it requires 
continual activities of preparedness. This temporality of intervention should be 
contrasted to population security, which involves continual intervention into the 
health, welfare, and conditions of existence of populations. The imperative to 
be prepared is based on a distribution of response functions across diverse 
state and non-state agencies in the event of an emergency, and thus requires 
ongoing readiness activities that test the functioning of these relationships. This 
political logic also suggests that the federal government role should be limited 
to coordination, technical support, and some financial support under normal 
conditions. Preparedness activity is thus distributed among federal, state, and 
local governments, and private and non-profit sector actors – and, potentially, 
families.The distribution of these roles has been, and remains, a central and 
contentious feature of discussions around vital systems security.4 
 
 
Historical Evolution of Vital Systems Security in the US 
 
The problems of vital systems security have been increasingly central in popular 
discussion recently as the United States has faced a series of events such as 
terror attacks and natural disasters that do not fit comfortably in the 
frameworks of sovereign state security or population security. This 
contemporary discussion draws on a longer post-World War II trajectory 
through which the elements of vital systems security took shape in the United 
States. A number of distinct moments are particularly important to the 
emergence of vital systems security at the level of the US federal government.5  
 
1. Early Cold War. During and after World War II military strategists 
recognized that the dawn of the air-nuclear age raised the prospect that 
the United States could be directly attacked, notwithstanding the barrier 
                                                
3 Like insurance, preparedness is a form of rationality that may be found outside the state. For 
example, private firms and international humanitarian organizations practice preparedness, and the 
preparedness activities of such organizations are a crucial part of state-based preparedness. 
4 According to this political logic, under extraordinary conditions, the federal government (through 
mechanisms such as joint tasks forces, states of emergency, or even, potentially, declaration of 
martial law) can assume direct command and control functions over response and recovery. 
5 The history of vital systems security is not limited to the federal government:  its techniques and 
practices were simultaneously honed in local government organizations, NGOs, and the private 
sector. 
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of oceans. They argued that the nation would have to remain in a 
“continuous state of readiness” for a surprise attack from the Soviet 
Union.  Alongside the “anticipatory mobilization” based on a logic of 
deterrence and containment after 1949, some planners argued for a 
massive civil defense effort, one that would protect “critical targets” in 
the event of an attack, so that the United States could survive the attack 
and fight back. Comprehensive plans for civil defense – formulated first 
by the military and then by civilian administrations – were implemented 
in a partial manner at best. But the general approach developed for civil 
defense, and many techniques associated with it, would be adapted 
later to other tasks of vital systems security. 
 
2. 1960s – 1970s:  All-Hazards Planning. A second phase in the 
development of vital systems security was driven from below. Local civil 
defense officials were skeptical about the possibility of defense against 
nuclear attack. But they took up techniques initially developed for civil 
defense, such as evacuation planning and training emergency 
responders, and applied them to new problems such as natural 
disasters. These officials began to define a new field of expertise – 
emergency management – and developed a new approach known as “all 
hazards” planning that defined operational guidelines for approaching 
diverse forms of threat with the same set of techniques. In the 1970s 
nuclear power and hazardous substances were added to these threats.  
State governments asked that coordination of Federal and local 
response to various types of emergencies be centralized, leading to the 
establishment of FEMA in 1979.6  
 
3. 1980s – 1990s:  Mission Struggles.  As was the case with civil defense, 
federal and local plans for an all-hazards approach to possible disasters 
were only partially implemented in the federal government.  In the 
decades after the founding of FEMA, the agency faced ongoing tension 
between its civil defense function and its task of emergency 
management. While Republican administrations tended to emphasize 
the former, Democratic presidents focused on the latter. During the 
Clinton administration, the domestic preparedness apparatus functioned 
relatively smoothly as a routinized mechanism for anticipating and 
responding to disasters.  Meanwhile preparedness techniques such as 
scenario planning and early warning systems migrated into new areas, 
such as global public health and humanitarianism. Some experts argued 
that new threats to vital systems, such as emerging infectious disease (in 
                                                
6 FEMA then “began development of an Integrated Emergency Management System with an all-
hazards approach that included "direction, control and warning systems which are common to the full 
range of emergencies from small isolated events to the ultimate emergency - war.’” 
http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm 
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the context of the AIDS epidemic), cyber-threats (especially in the lead 
up to Y2K), and global terrorism should be elevated to the level of 
“national security” issues in the post-Cold War era. 
 
4. 2001 – Present:  Vital Systems Security after 9/11. The attacks of 9/11, 
the anthrax letters, Hurricane Katrina, and the anticipation of an avian flu 
pandemic have catalyzed activity related to vital systems security. After 
9/11 the Bush administration created the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Although DHS was largely associated with its counter-
terrorism function, the new Department also incorporated FEMA, thus 
assuming functions of emergency management and disaster response. 
Thus, in principle – although not, it would turn out, in practice – DHS was 
founded on the basic premise of “all-hazards” planning:  that response 
to terror attacks and response to natural disasters would require a 
similar range of competencies, capacities, and planning approaches. 
The first general strategic planning document of DHS – a ‘preparedness 
guidance’ released in spring 2005 – included in its portfolio of scenarios 
not only a range of possible terrorist attacks but also a hurricane, an 
earthquake, and pandemic influenza as the major events for which it had 
to plan.7   
 
 
New Problematizations of Security 
 
The increasing centrality of vital systems security comes in the context of a 
broader process through which collective security has been newly 
problematized after the Cold War. What threats to collective security are the 
most pressing? How should they be understood? And what organizations 
should be responsible for managing them?  
 
During the Cold War, “national security” was largely associated with deterring 
and containing the Soviet threat. The end of the Cold War provoked a broad 
rethinking of the terrain of security among scholars, policy-makers, and 
strategists. Under the rubric of terms such as “human security” and 
“environmental security” some analysts proposed expanding the purview of 
security problems beyond traditional geopolitical issues to questions such as 
global poverty, environmental crisis, and emerging infectious disease. Such 
proposals raised the question of how problems previously associated with 
population security might be addressed by a “national security” apparatus that 
had been oriented predominantly to the problems of sovereign state security. At 
the same time, but from a different direction, questions were raised concerning 
                                                
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance. Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness.  April 27, 2005.  
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/ NationalPreparednessGuidance.pdf 
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the role of the military in a post-Cold War world. Strategic planners raised 
questions such as: What kinds of missions should the US military be involved 
in? Who is the enemy?  What kind of military does the United States need? 
 
It is against the backdrop of this broad reorientation of “collective security” 
problems that governmental responses to the attacks of 9/11 should be 
analyzed. These responses included the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and a North American Central Command of the US 
military (NORTHCOM).  At least one of the underlying rationales for the 
establishment of DHS was to increase vital systems security – thus, as noted 
above, DHS incorporated FEMA and in its official plans endorsed an “all-
hazards” approach. But the department was also charged with functions linked 
to other logics of security, such as law enforcement and intelligence.  
Meanwhile, it quickly became apparent that the real focus of attention by the 
Bush administration would be on older conceptions and practices of sovereign 
state security. First, the administration expanded “exceptional” powers – 
beyond the normal rules of domestic law enforcement and the normal rules of 
foreign military engagement – to prosecute “the war on terror.”  Second, it 
sought to project American power abroad and to make fighting terrorism – like 
fighting communism in an earlier era – a primary goal of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
American power.  Proponents of vital systems security have been highly critical 
of this approach, arguing that it focuses on the wrong problem, and may even 
increase the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures. 
 
Given the relative neglect of vital systems security in the Bush response to 
9/11, it is significant that the next major event to generate widespread concern 
about the security of the U.S. population was not another terrorist attack but 
Hurricane Katrina.  The response to Katrina made visible a number of lingering 
tensions around collective security after the Cold War. First, it raised the 
question of the responsibility of the federal government – as opposed to local, 
state, non-governmental, and private sector entities – in dealing with major 
emergencies. Second, it made visible a crucial confusion in the mission of DHS. 
The most striking failures of the response to Katrina had to do with 
communications, coordination among different governmental agencies, and 
emergency management.  These failures were, in part, symptoms of the fact 
that the DHS leadership was not oriented to a vital systems security mission. 
What was lacking was not vigilant attention to the onset of an attack or disaster 
(Katrina, after all, was anticipated days in advance). Rather, it was vigilance in 
ensuring that readiness and response capacities were in place. Finally, 
response to the hurricane indicated uncertainty about the role of the military in 
domestic crises. This uncertainty was accentuated when the next major 
hurricane approached the Gulf coast and President Bush, eager to project 
greater readiness and attentiveness to the disaster, flew to the headquarters of 
NORTHCOM – a military command center – to monitor its arrival.  
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The identification of vital systems security as a distinctive form of collective 
security is helpful in unpacking many of the confusions and tensions that have 
surfaced in the response to 9/11, Katrina, and other events. Vital systems 
security operates alongside – and often in tension with – population security 
and sovereign state security.  And many current confusions relate to the 
organizational framework within which these forms of collective security – with 
their attendant rationalities for understanding and responding to threat – are 
managed. The current division of labor between organizations engaged in 
sovereign state security and population security took shape over the course of 
the 20th century. The military has been charged with national security problems 
involving foreign enemies. Meanwhile, the ‘civilian’ administration of federal, 
state, or local governments have been largely responsible for population 
security. 
 
Although vital systems security in the United States emerged initially in relation 
to problems of sovereign state security (through civil defense planning in the 
early period of the Cold War), its relationship to both military and civilian 
administration has been ambiguous. Threats to vital systems sometimes 
originate from foreign enemies, as in the case of terror attacks or aerial 
bombing. But activities to increase preparedness necessarily involve functions 
such as health care and domestic emergency response that are generally 
relegated to civilian administration, or to actors in the private or non-profit 
sectors. What is more, after the advent of all-hazards planning in the 1960s and 
1970s, vital systems security took up “threats without enemies” such as natural 
disasters or pandemic disease that seemed unambiguously outside the scope 
of military activity. And yet, as we have recently been made aware, the military 
may play a central role in the response to such events. 
 
Currently, there is a general demand that the government take responsibility for 
ensuring the functioning of vital systems in the event of emergency. And a 
broad range of organizations, both inside and outside the Federal Government, 
are currently taking up preparedness activities and beginning to mobilize 
resources in the name of vital systems security: DHS, The Department of Health 
and Human Services, various parts of the Department of Defense, national 
guard units, local first responders, and so on. But these diverse activities – and 
the growing volume of resources spent on them – is only the beginning of what 
will certainly be a long process through which vital systems security is made 
more central to practices of collective security more generally. In this context, 
critical responses to the current situation tend to be overly event-focused and 
reactive rather than broad-thinking and programmatic.  We suggest that an 
initial step toward a more serious critical intervention is one of conceptual 
clarification. 
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Political and Analytical Orientations 
 
One contribution of the schema that we have developed in this paper might be 
to help reframe the stakes of political discussions around security. Despite a 
great diversity of positions in debates about security, they tend to share a 
common conviction that the important problems can be framed in terms of the 
question of “too much” or “too little” security; they treat security as a zero-sum 
game in which there is a tradeoff between security and other values. Thus, 
critics on the left have tended to link any effort toward “security” with the 
militarization of civil society, the repression of individual freedom, and the 
expansion of empire. The predominant tendency on the right is to baldly assert 
absolute sovereign prerogative to act with impunity in the name of security. 
Centrist democrats face a trap in which, on the one hand they are worried 
about civil liberties, but on the other hand cannot be seen to be ‘against’ 
security.  
 
Our suggestion is that it might be more analytically productive not to ask how 
much or how little security is appropriate, or whether security must at the 
expense of other values such as liberty or welfare. Rather, it is more 
appropriate to ask which forms of collective security are in question, what kinds 
of expertise are being mobilized to provide security, and how the politics of 
security are changing? 
 
From the perspective of an analytics of collective security, the most significant 
reframing of discussions around security may be taking place not at the level of 
high politics – or, for that matter, at the level of high theory – but at the level of 
what Michel Foucault called “specific intellectuals.” These figures have specific 
expertise that can, under certain circumstances, take on “general significance” 
by engaging in local struggles that can “have effects and implications which are 
not simply professional or sectoral.”8  For example, the infectious disease 
expert Laurie Garrett argues that a broad investment in global public health 
infrastructure will increase national biosecurity. This position provokes 
resistance from many security planners, who tend to think in terms of “one bug 
one drug” interventions, and from many public health advocates, who tend to 
be suspicious of the security apparatus.  Stephen Flynn, an expert in 
transportation and port security, maintains that the choice between open, free 
shipping systems and security has been misposed. Rather, he argues, security 
(and here he refers to what we have called vital systems security) means 
securing open systems of free circulation. In making this argument, he meets 
resistance from various quarters: from big business and its political supporters, 
who resist security measures on the grounds that they will impose unwanted 
costs, and from some on the left, who suspect that any increase in security will 
necessarily compromise civil liberties.  
                                                
8 Foucault, Truth and Power, p. 132. 
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The work of such specific intellectuals points to ways that the politics of 
security might be reframed. One role of anthropologists of the contemporary – 
which this paper undertakes in a preliminary way – is to provide concepts that 
might help map this reframing, and that might increase sensitivity to changes 
that emerge. Another might be to develop specific lines of inquiry focused on 
the work of such specific intellectuals as particularly productive sites for 
anthropological inquiry. Thus, for example, sites such as syndromic 
surveillance9, vaccination programs10, or techniques of preparedness11 may be 
the most promising place to study “the political, economic, institutional regime 
of the production of truth” as it relates to problems of security.12 
                                                
9 See Lyle Fearnley, “’From Chaos to Controlled Disorder’:Syndromic Surveillance, Bioweapons, and 
the Pathological Future.” Working Paper. Anthropology of the Contemporary Research Collaboratory, 
2005. 
10 Dale Rose, “How Did the Smallpox Vaccination Program Come About?”  Working Paper.  
Anthropology of the Contemporary Research Collaboratory.”  2006. 
11 Andrew Lakoff, “Preparing for the Next Emergency.” Working Paper. Anthropology fo the 
Contemporary Research Collaboratory. 2006. 
12 Foucault, “Truth and Power.” 
